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ON THE OTHER SIDE OF SILENCE: AFFECTIVE
LAWYERING FOR INTIMATE ABUSE
Linda G. Millst

If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be
like hearingthe grassgrow and the squirrel'sheart beat, and we should die of
that roarwhich lies on the other side of silence.'

I
ON THE OTHER SIDE OF SILENCE

Shades of violence and dimensions of abuse penetrate every
shared space. An uninvited interruption, a slammed door, a disregarding glance-a spit, a slap, a sock. One afternoon's folly can be next
week's destruction. To be pushed may be play, a wrestling match, or
abuse. When is rape, rape? Is it the night of the incident, or two years
later when the denial lifts and you recall that he forced himself on you
despite your pleas to stop?
Violence depends-depends on a mood, an interpretation, a history. It depends on an awareness, a consciousness if you will, that
one's experience is violent. Denial, often a mediating force in the face
of abuse, can be so fierce that it deafens the silence that is screaming.
Meanwhile to the observer, to you, there is no silence. You hear only
a roaring injustice: systematically, she is robbed of her dignity, deprived of her character, mutilated from heart to bone. You become
enraged, possibly even violent yourself. Paradoxically, your denial
mirrors hers-a denial so fierce that it deafens the silence that is
t Assistant Professor, UCLA, Department of Social Welfare, School of Public Policy
and Social Research, Ph.D., Brandeis University (1993), M.S.W., San Francisco State University (1986);J.D. Hastings College of Law (1983).
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screaming. She too hears a voice, so loud and so clear, that it silences
all the others: This is all I have! This is what I deserve!
Describing her own and other women's histories of domestic violence, Martha Mahoney found that "[w] e resisted defining the entire
experience of marriage by the episodes of violence that had marked
the relationship's lowest points."2 Indeed, "the daily reality of the
marriages... defined most of our memories and retrospective sense
of the relationship: these were 'bad' marriages, not ordeals of physical torture."3 One woman describing her experience of violence explained: "I just thought that... in order to be a battered woman you
had to be really battered. I mean OK, I had a couple of bad incidents,
but mostly it was pretty minor... 'violence.' I didn't see myself in that
4
category, as a battered woman at all."
Recent feminist theory has begun to question the utility of relying
on currently formulated legal methods to regulate domestic abuse. 5 I
am concerned that existing strategies which unilaterally criminalize
intimate abuse and which disentangle, and in many cases divorce, the
survivor from the battering situation may so exacerbate her denial,
and alienate her from her personal history and emotional experience,
that she may never obtain the help she needs to free herself from
violence. 6 R.J. Gelles and M.A. Straus estimate that only 14 percent of
2 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. Rav. 1, 16 (1991).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 16-17. For an astute reading of how the continuum of abuse operates, partic-

ularly as it relates to larger problems of power and control within intimate relationships,
see Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: ChallengesofFeminist Theoy and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse; 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 537-39 (1992). See generally Martha
Minow, Beyond Universality, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 130-31 (1989) (arguing that "[t]aking all
women seriously should mean respecting women's own conceptions of themselves and
their interests").
5 See, e.g., Christine Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition, in FAMLy MATrERS: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAw 261 (Martha Minow ed., 1993); Mahoney, supranote 2, at 4-7, 64-71; Schneider, supranote 4, at 526-29. Feminists to date have
been more engaged in this problem theoretically, than they have in contemplating a practical solution. Indeed, my search of the literature did not reveal any comprehensive proposals for legal reform which respond to the emotional, social, cultural, and political
contingencies of battered women who rely on the legal system to interrupt the violence in
their lives.
6 By criminalization strategies, I refer to the efforts by battered women's advocates
and policymakers, both nationally and internationally, to implement such legal procedures
as preferred arrest. SeeJ. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, III, FemaleSpouse Abuse and the
PoliceResponse: The Charlotte,North CarolinaExperimen4 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 82,
86 (1992). For a description of preferred arrest policies and prosecution laws, see Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence Prosecutions,109
HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1865-66 (1996); Angela Corsilles, Note, No-DropPoliciesin the Prosecution
of Domestic Violence Cases: Guaranteeto Action or DangerousSolution, 63 FoRanM L. REv. 853
(1994). For a comprehensive overview of these approaches, see UNITED NATIONS, STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING DoMEsnc VIOLENCE: A RESOURCE MANUAL 12-47 (1993) [hereinaf-
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battered women 7 who experience "severe" violence ever contact the police.8 In
Sweden, where wife-beating was made a public offense in 1982, only
31 percent of battered women surveyed in 1989 reported that they
wanted their batterer arrested.9 Not only are women not using the
strategies made available to them through the legal system, but men
too often become more violent, not less, following arrest. 10 Given the
critical commonality of battered women's denial, the deeply personal
nature of intimate violence, and, most significantly, the paradoxes and
exigencies of domestic abuse, I argue in this essay for comprehensive
legal reform which forces us to re-formulate our institutional responses to domestic violence, and to imagine new ways of relating to
battered women who access those systems. In sum, I propose intervention strategies for battered women that respect interactional structures of relating and provide, above all, opportunities for survivors to
develop remedies that respond to their particular needs."
To achieve a restructuring of legal interventions for battered women, the interpretive framework of domestic violence practice must
ter STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING DoMESTIc VIOLENCE]. Other criminalization efforts are
described herein. See infra part II.B.
7 I am aware that the use of the term "survivor," or other terms not yet imagined, is
preferred to the dominant terminology "battered woman," since the latter implies an essentialist or totalizing quality. For further explanation, see Schneider, supranote 4, at 52931. Given that women who experience violence often reject the term battered woman to
describe themselves, it is important that we become cognizant of the ways our language
constructs an ideology of judgment and exclusion. "Victim" of domestic violence is also
inadequate insofar as it fails to capture the strength and sheer determination of battered
women who have endured intimate abuse. Even "survivor" is far from perfect, as many
women who have experienced domestic violence do not see themselves as having "survived." Given these conflicting realities, I use the terms "battered woman," "survivor," and,
to a much lesser extent, "victim," interchangeably, in the hope that I have considered, and
included as many women's experiences as possible. I remain on the search for a more
competent term to describe the myriad of violent contingencies women endure.

8 RICHARDJ. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 149 (1988). Gelles and Straus in the Second

National Family Violence Survey used a national representative sample of women who were
married to or cohabiting with their male parmers. They examined whether battered women had called the police. Less than three percent of the women who experienced "minor" violence immediately called the police; only fourteen percent of those who
experienced beating, choking, and other forms of "severe" violence did so. Id.
9 R. Amy Elman & Maud L. Edwards, Unprotected by the Swedish Welfare State: A Survey
of Battered Women and the Assistance They Received, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 413, 445

(1991).
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Incidents of Domestic
Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of FourField Experiments, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 698, 698 (1992);
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal
Control ofDomestic Viwlence, 57 Am. Soc. REv. 680 (1992) [hereinafter Sherman et al., Crime,
Punishment,and Stake in Conformity]; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The VariableEffects ofArrest
on Criminal Careers:The Milwaukee Domestic Vwlence Experiment, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 189 (1992) [hereinafter Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest].
11 For an analysis of particularity in feminist legal discourse and systems, see Schneider, supra note 4, passim.
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be radically transformed. This article argues that three theoretical
limitations of contemporary domestic violence legal practice prevent
battered American women from seeking the services they need to imagine and achieve safety. The first problem is that the legal system
isolates, individuates, and intimidates the survivor by conceiving of the
rights of and interventions for battered women as abstract, predetermined, and immutable. Second, the law attempts to eradicate violence rather than to understand it in all its complexity, particularly
the cultural interpretations of violence which contraindicate essentializing legal interventions and the emotional contingencies of intimate
abuse which make it difficult, if not impossible, to legislate fixed methods of response. Third and correlatively, the law fails to approach
domestic violence as involving two subjectivities, as existing in a mutual "space in between" intimates.
From this vantage point, I build upon my own experience of
teaching students and training practitioners in the techniques of what
I have come to term "Affective Lawyering."1 2 Affective lawyering involves meeting clients on their own ground in spaces co-created by
advocate and client, and formulated on a mutual recognition of distinctly similar, yet uniquely different, emotions. It is a method which
assumes that differences between clients and advocates can be transgressed when lawyers recognize and shed their assumptions, fears, and
canned solutions. More importantly though, it is a method which demands from advocates working with people who enter the legal system
emotionally frightened and politically disempowered, that these
"meetings" occur at the "interpersonal" level. Toward this end, affective lawyers understand that progressive advocacy depends on their
ability to feel their own impotence in the subtext of their own relational worlds, and on their capacity to acknowledge their powerlessness in the face of lovers, supervisors, opposing counsel, or judges
more powerful or seemingly more persuasive than themselves. Affective lawyering, then, demands that lawyers understand their own political and social transformation, not intellectually or ideologically, but
rather, through their personal experiences of strength and weakness,
passion and melancholy, distance and deprivation in all facets of their
lives. Only when advocates begin to do this insightful work, will they
12 The only reference I have seen to "affective lawyering" is in Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Volence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access,
Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. Rgv. 1071 passim (1995). Margulies uses the term

"affective lawyering" interchangeably with such concepts as access, connection, and voice,
contrasting it with other forms of lawyering, such as an instrumental approach. Margulies
argues that an affective approach demands that advocates spend "time" with their clients,
that they be willing to self-disclose, and that they be attentive to the needs of these interpersonal relationships. Ultimately Margulies argues for what he calls a "contextual approach." Id. at 1092-1103. See also infra part II.0, for a further explication of Margulies's
approach.

1996]

1229

AFFECTIVE LAIYER1NG

have the tools necessary to "crawl inside" their clients and feel, from
the inside out, the oppression neither the lawyer nor the client may
have the language to vocalize. 13 From this personal work and shared
strength, comes the broader based political commitment to act not
only on behalf of, or with, the so-called client, but also to build larger
coalitions with women or other marginalized groups, which both the
advocate and client are now poised to understand together.
In its more limited application to intimate abuse, affective lawyering refers specifically to the need to understand the emotional contours and the subjective and relational structure of violence so as to be
able to address it in a sensitive or affective, and hence, concrete and
diverse practice. Affective lawyers in the domestic violence context
are therefore both cognizant of the differences between themselves
and their clients, their own abuse, and the abuse of the battered women before them, and simultaneously capable of finding the shared
ground, or space in between, that is, the similarities of the violence
they have both endured, which serves to bridge the differences between them.
I argue that an affective method, more than any other political
lawyering theory or technique, 14 is critical for responding to the survi13 Only from this perspective can the lawyer realize the strength that is endemic in an
argument or strategy that starts with the connection between lawyer and client.
14 By political lawyering I refer to a genre of several literature, including GERALD LoPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO's VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE passim

(1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, ReconstructivePoverty Law Practice:LearningLessonsof ClientNarrative, 100 YALE .J2107, 2118-30 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speakingout of Turn: The Story of
Josephine V, 4 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 620-28 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, TheAntinomies of
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659
(1987-1988); Linda Durston & Linda G. Mills, Toward a New Dynamic in Poverty ClientEmpowerment: The Rhetoric, Politics, and Therapeuticsof Opening Statements in Social Security Disability
Hearings,8 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 119 (1996); Louise G. Trubek, The Worst of Times.

.

.and

the Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today, 22 FORDHAM URB. Lj. 1123, 1132-40
(1995); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Marginsof the Lawsuit: Making Spacefor Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv.L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 538-40 (1987-1988); Lucie E. White, No Exit:
Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from aDifferent Ground, 81 GEo. L.J. 1961, 1990-2002 (1993);
Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF.L. REv. 1, 52-57 (1990); Lucie White, Theoretics of Practice:The Integration
of Progressive Thought and Action: Paradox,Piece-Work, and Patience,43 HASTINGS LJ. 853 passim (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (reviewing GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAwYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992)). This movement was kick-started by the pioneering work of Gary

Bellow and Bea Moulton, The LawyeringProcess: Materialsfor ClinicalInstruction in Advocacy
(1978). Both feminist and critical race scholars have also proposed political lawyering theories and methods. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, "BadMothers," "Good Lawtyers, " and "LegalEthics,"
81 GEO. LJ. 253, 2536-46 (1993); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of
Feminism and ClinicalEducation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1646-67 (1991); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of ProgressiveLegal Theory
and Practice,43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 749-59 (1992); Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Laryering,
81 CAL. L. REv. 1363, passim (1993) (reviewing GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE

(1992)).
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vor's need for flexibility and for helping her work through her personal ways of knowing, being, and relating as she learns to distinguish
in her own mind and soul between violence and healthy expressions
of intimacy. Affective clinical practices address the survivor in her
own emotional space and respond to the specific relationship and
subjectivities within which she is to be found. Rather than adopting a
normative approach, this postmodern 15 clinical approach respects the
survivor's relational structure, and also provides the space, the time,
and the fluidity necessary for self-guided resolution. Such a process
also recognizes that true empowerment for battered women will be
achieved not through obedience to the expectations of lawyers or social workers, but rather through a system which acknowledges that she
herself must reconsider and reevaluate the meaning of the violence in
a time frame and an environment that supports the fluctuating complexity of her particular circumstance. This Article proceeds in four
parts. Part I presents a critique of current legal practices, theories,
and methods. Part II maps the existing, and some of the most innovative, legal systems which have emerged transnationally over the past
twenty years-institutions that have been designed by feminists and
survivors alike to respond to the needs of battered women. Also in
Part II, the interactive framework of domestic violence legal practice is
explored, particularly as it has been described in the law school
clinical literature. Such reflection is important not only because the
lawyer-law student/client relationship almost always marks the battered woman's initiation into the legal system, but it also has important implications for the larger politics of domestic violence. Part III
draws on theories of institutional violence, and the law and emotion
literature, to posit a model of relational, or affective justice, which
takes account of the particularities of each battered woman's experience, and begins to imagine a system and a method of relating which
can respond more flexibly to the unique complexities that financial,
cultural, and emotional contingencies place on the battered woman.
Part IV concludes with a proposal for overhauling domestic violence
legal practice, combining systemic reform with methods for representing battered women using affective lawyering techniques and drawing
from the best institutional and interactional practices being employed
today. This comprehensive reform is designed to ensure that all battered women who find the courage to seek assistance from the legal
system will be given the opportunity at their own pace, and from their
15 By postmodern, I refer to the notion that clinical certainty is neither desirable nor
achievable. "The operable assumption here is that legal and social work advocates must
abandon clinical postures which claim to 'know' how a battered woman feels and instead
adopt a position at least of measured clinical uncertainty." Linda G. Mills, Empowering Battered Women Transnationally:The Case for Postmodem Interventions, 41 Soc. WonK 261, 262
(1996).
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own peculiar cultural and political position, to explore the screaming
silence. And for advocates to do the same.
II
EXISTING AND INNOVATIVE INTERVENTIONS AND INTERACTIVE
FRAMEWORKS FOR TREATING THE PROBLEM OF

WOMAN ABUSE

Each year, in the United States alone, at least two million women
of all races and classes are physically abused by a spouse or intimate
partner. 16 Thus, exceeding childbirth, automobile accidents, muggings, and all other medical emergencies, battery by a spouse or lover
is the single most common reason women enter hospital emergency
rooms; in fact, one out of three women who use emergency medical
services has been battered.' 7 Furthermore, in 1993, twenty-seven percent of all violence against women was committed by their lovers or
ex-lovers.' 8 These statistics suggest that spousal abuse is widespread
and that it does not occur exclusively in the home of the "other."' 9
American women are certainly not alone in this regard. A crosscultural study of family violence found that wife beating occurs in
more than eighty-four percent of the ninety societies examined.2 0 In
Canada and Guatemala, twenty-five to forty percent of women studied
had been abused by an intimate partner.2 1 In Chile, Colombia, and
16 Murray A. Straus & RichardJ. Gelles, Societal Change and Change in Family Violence
from 1975 to 1985 As Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 465, 470
(1986).

17 A.H. Flitcraft et al., Diagnosticand Treatment Guidelineson Domestic Violence, AM. MED.
ASSN. 8 (1992).
18 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Domestic Violence: Violence Between Intimates, in BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS 1-2 (1994).

19 For an insightful discussion of the "othering" prevalent in domestic violence discourse, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Vwlence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1258-62 (1991) (describing the efforts of one U.S. senator to sell the Violence Against Women Act of 1991 to elite whites by
describing intimate abuse as not only a problem in inner cities, but also a problem for
urban and rural women). Crenshaw astutely observes:

Rather than focusing on and illuminating how violence is disregarded when
the home is "othered," the strategy implicit in Senator Boren's remarks
functions instead to politicize the problem only in the dominant community... The point here is not that the Violence Against Women Act is
particularistic on its own terms, but that unless the Senators and other
policymakers ask why violence remained insignificant as long as it was understood as a minority problem, it is unlikely that women of color will share
equally in the distribution of resources and concern.
Id. at 1260.
20 David Levinson, Family Violence in Cross-CulturalPerspective, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE 435, 443 (Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
21 Lori L.Heise et al., Violence Against Women: The Hidden Health Burden, 255 WORLD
BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 6-7 (1994) (citing Lori Haskell & Melanie Randall, The Women's
Safety Project: Summary of Key StatisticalFindings, CAN. PANEL ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

(Ottawa 1993)).
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Belgium, the figure ranges from forty-one to sixty percent.2 2 In Europe (not including the countries of the former Soviet Union), between twelve and twenty-four million women and girls are subjected to
violence each year.2 3 Estimates for Sweden, often considered a model
country for gender equality, indicate that a woman is battered by a
24
current or former intimate partner every twenty minutes.
Over the past twenty years, feminists and domestic violence advocates alike have fashioned interventions, some more deliberate than
others, to address the devastating effects of intimate abuse-effects
which had previously been all but ignored.2 5 The legal treatment of
domestic violence, then, mirrors an evolving consciousness, a realization that men who beat their wives should be given the same legal
treatment as men who beat their neighbors. Moreover, it reflects a
belief that the criminal justice system should act unequivocally to protect a battered woman from her abuser and that the threat of incarceration will deter future perpetrators from violence.
Transnationally, arrest and prosecution laws, and in this country,
civil protection orders, have become the cornerstone of this unyielding response. Recently, the United States and otherjurisdictions have
augmented these interventions with new strategies designed to increase the effectiveness of restraining orders and prosecution of batterers. Most notable are mandatory or preferred arrest policies when
the victim is visibly injured or when there is probable cause to believe
a crime has been committed. 26 Some jurisdictions also employ
mandatory prosecution or a no-drop policy.2 7 Court proceedings and
22 Id. at 6-7 (citing Soledad Larrain, Estudio deFrecueciade la Vzwlencia Intrafamiliaryla
Condiion de la Mujer eriChile, PAN-Am. HEALTH ORG. (Santiago, Chile 1993)); PROFAMILIA,
Enchestra de Prevalencia, Demografia y Salud, DEMOGRApHIC & HEALTH SURV. (Bagata, Chile
1990). See R. Bruynooghe et al., Study of Physical & Sexual Violence Against Belgian Women,
DEP'T OF SCIENcES HUMAINES & SOCIALES, LIMBURGS UNIV. CENTRUM (Belg. 1989).
23
UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCE ON HuMAN RIGHTS, TESTIMONIES OF THE
GLOBAL TRIBUNAL OF VIOLATIONS OF WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UNIrD NATIONS
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (Vienna, 1993).

24 Elman & Edwards, supra note 9, at 413.
25 For an overview of these interventions, see LEGAL RESPONSES TO WFE ASSAULT:
CuRRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993); BarbaraJ. Hart, State Codes on
Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, Juv.& FAM. Cr.J., n.d., 1992, at
3, 48-62. See generally Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1992)
(reporting views of several authors).
26 For information regarding the effectiveness of these interventions, see Greg Anderson, Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police That Liability Looms for the Failure to
Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MiAMi L. REv. 333 (1985); Daniel Goleman, Do
Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Viwlence , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at 4.
27 Mandatory prosecution, often called "No-Drop," is a policy under which a domestic
violence prosecution will not be dropped due to victim non-participation in the prosecution's case. This policy can exist in the form of a statement, practice, or protocol. NoDrop policies emphasize that the State, and not the victim, is a party to the action. States
that have no-drop policies follow one of two versions of this policy-hard or soft. A hard
No-Drop policy does not, in any way, take into consideration the victim's preference to
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coordinated responses that provide more sensitive interventions for
battered women have also been implemented.2 8 The existing and innovative strategies described in this section, and the methods of relating to battered women explored in the next section, have all emerged
in response to a growing awareness that we are witnessing gender warfare and that we must take drastic steps to arrest it. They reflect an
assumption that violence against women, particularly in intimate relationships, is so rampant, life-threatening, and out of the woman's control that only a system-imposed legal response can adequately address
the naked proportions of the problem. Although I do not dispute
the exigencies of intimate abuse, I question, in these sections, and in
Part III of this essay, the effectiveness of this unidimensional criminal
response-all of which provides a launching pad from which to explore my proposal to overhaul the institutional and interactive
frameworks of domestic violence policy described in Part IV.
A.

Criminal Intervention Strategies

Despite the good intentions of some early advocates of criminal
response to domestic violence, arrest and prosecution have not
proven effective in reducing violence against women in the family. In
the short term, mandatory arrest appears to reduce future battering
by minor offenders, but to escalate violence by offenders2 9 who have
previously spent significant time in jail, depending in part on such

drop the case. In contrast, soft No-Drop policies permit the victims to drop charges under
certain circumstances such as after receiving counseling and appearing in front of ajudge
to explain why they want to drop the charges. As of 1994, four states (Utah, Wisconsin,
Florida, and Minnesota) had adopted legislation enacting no-drop policies. See Naomi R.
Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecutionof Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview, in DoMESTIG VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINALJUSTICE RESPONSE 161, 168-69 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); Corsilles, supra note 6, at 858-63.
28 The most famous of the more comprehensive approaches is the Duluth Model. See,
e.g., Teri Randall, Duluth Takes Firm Stance Against Domestic Volence; Mandates Abuser Arrest,
Education, 266J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1180 passim (1991) (describing the model). Other similar
projects are described by Demie Kurz, Batteringand the CriminalJustice System: A Feminist
Vew, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CiMrNALJuSTicE RESPONSE 21, 33-35 (Eve S.

Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992). Other efforts have complemented these critical
legal strategies. Shelter and other services are available, but still wholly inadequate. See,
e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1262-65 (discussing the inaccessiblility of domestic violence support services to many non-English speaking women). Educational campaigns
which inform the public about the dangers of domestic violence have been somewhat ineffective. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick et al., Changes in Perceived Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Legal SanctionsforInterpersonalVwlence, 1982-1992, 8 VIOLENCE & VIMms 44, 31323 (1993). For a more positive assessment of educational campaigns, see STRAXEGIES FOR
CONFRONTING DOMESTC VIOLENCE, supra note 6, at 85-96.

29

Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 117.
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factors as the employment and marital status of the batterer.3 0 After
3
six months, even minor offenders tend to abuse again. '
Civil protection orders, which enjoin a batterer from further violence or threats, are often cited as helpful tools for American women.3 2 Because in most American states they can be used either in

conjunction with criminal proceedings or on their own in civil
court,33 protection orders potentially give women the means to fash-

ion their own remedies according to their needs. However, a recent
study of women who obtained temporary protection orders found that
sixty percent of them experienced physical or psychological abuse in
34
the year following the issuance of the order.
The problem with civil protection orders, prosecution, and arrest
policies is that they effectively require women to terminate their abusive relationships. Although on the surface this outcome seems desirable, studies show that battered women who attempt to leave their
abusers may be most at risk for more serious attacks by their batterers,
and even femicide. 3 5 Ironically then, criminal strategies which seek to
terminate the abuse and hence the relationship through legal interventions may prove more, rather than less, dangerous. Further, recent feminist theory, discussed in Part III, indicates that for women,
whether they are battered or not, to terminate relationships involves
far more complex action than early advocates of criminal interventions ever thought.
B. More Innovative Legal/Social Work Strategies
Recently we have witnessed the implementation of several innovations adopted in the United States and other countries that do not
rely exclusively on criminal legal strategies, but seek to incorporate
alternative legal and also social work methods to respond to the problem of domestic violence. Although, as the following descriptions reveal, these leading innovations may provide a more woman-centered
approach, they still fall to incorporate contingent realities that demand a legal response which meets the varying emotional, cultural,
and financial needs of battered women. In addition, these innova30
Berk, supra, note 10, at 702-03; Sherman, Crime, Punishment, and State in Conformity,
supranote 10, at 160-61; Sherman, The Variable Effects of Arrest, supra note 10, at 685.
31 Sherman, The Variable Effects of Arrest, supra note 10, at 154, 167.
32
See, e.g., Susan L. Keilitz, CivilProtection Orders:A Viablejustice System ToolforDeterring
Domestic V'olence, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 79, 80 (1994).
33 Id. at 80.
34 Id. at 82.
35 Barbara Hart, Beyond the "Duty to Warn": A Therapist's "Duty to Protect" Battered Women
and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTrVS ON WIFE ABUSE 234, 240-41 (Kersti YlIo & Michele
Bograd eds., 1988); Karen Stout, "IntimateFemicide": Effect of Legislation and Social Services, 4
AFFIL A 21, 22 (1989).
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tions fail to rectify the more subtle problem that any criminal-oriented
intervention, innovative or not, unwittingly encourages battered women's advocates and counselors to disempower survivors by robbing
them of a critical opportunity to design their own responses to the
36
violence in their lives.
Hawaii, for example, has attempted to address family matters in a
more sensitive fashion by adjudicating woman and child abuse, divorce, and juvenile delinquency matters in a unified criminal and civil
court. This unified court may administer a more "therapeutic justice"
than do traditional courts, but it nevertheless remains limited in its
ability to respond to the particular needs of battered women. Among
others, Barbara Hart, Legal Director of Pennsylvania Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, has argued that revealing spousal abuse in one
proceeding, however, may affect a woman's credibility in another fam37
ily matter (such as child custody) adjudicated by the same court.
In a more tailored but still comprehensive program, Dade
County, Florida launched a dedicated Domestic Violence Court in November, 1992. The Dade County court considers criminal aspects of
woman and child abuse exclusively. In doing so, it incorporates some
social work methodologies and is woman-centered in that it recognizes domestic violence as a problem of "male power" in our society.
The court strives to stop the violence, protect the victim and her children, make the offender accountable, and make treatment available
as needed.38 This court also represents institutional progress,
although I would argue that this dedicated court would be even more
effective were it to provide administrative and civil as well as criminal
remedies.
Like Dade County's dedicated Domestic Violence Court, the Winnipeg Family Violence Court in Winnipeg, Canada hears only cases of
child, spouse, and elder abuse. 39 A study of the court's effectiveness
during its first two years concentrated on the program's stated goals,
namely processing cases within three months, reducing case attrition
before sentencing, and imposing more appropriate sentences on
abusers.40 The study found that the average processing time was close
to the three-month goal (2.8 months in the first year and 3.5 months
in the second year) .41 It also found, however, that woman abuse cases
were slightly less rigorously prosecuted, perhaps because newly insti36 For a more thorough discussion of this problem, see infra part IMl.
37 See generallyUnified Courts: A Preliminary Discussion (minutes ofJune 1, 1993 conference at Palmer House, Chicago).
38

U.M. Alums, Help Stop the Violence, 48 BARRISTER: U. MW41 SCH. L. ALUMNI

10 (1993).
39
40
41

E.Jane Ursel, The Winnipeg Family Violence Court, 14 STAT. CAN. 1 (1994).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
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tuted mandatory arrest and prosecution policies often result in weak
evidence and in complainants reluctant to proceed. 42 Changes in sentencing practices in the Winnipeg Family Violence Court have also
resulted in higher rates of incarceration and in higher percentages of
offenders being sent to batterer or alcohol treatment programs. 43
Sao Paulo, Brazil offers yet another approach to draw women into
the legal system. This model is similarly important to consider in developing a truly comprehensive solution to the problem of domestic
violence. As background, it is important to note that Brazil is the first
country in the world to target domestic violence in its national constitution; in 1988 Brazil required its state governments to "suppress violence within the family."44 Sao Paulo has translated this strong
ideological stance into forty-one women-staffed police stations, including female investigators and jailkeepers, dedicated solely to crimes
against women. 45 Officers investigate women's reports of assault, bat46
tery, and sex crimes, and social workers help with non-legal needs.
Since the institution of these programs, complaints of woman abuse
have skyrocketed, 47 signifying that many women think these police sta48
tions are helpful.
Two other programs, one in Hamilton, New Zealand, and the
other in Duluth, Minnesota, also employ groundbreaking and more
comprehensive approaches to combatting domestic violence. Both
provide integrated legal and social services for the victim and the batterer. The program in Hamilton, New Zealand, uses a coordinated
multi-agency approach, monitoring the consistency of police, corrections, court, and shelter responses. 49 In addition, it provides educational programs for abusers and support services for battered
42
43
44
45

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.

[Constitution] tit. VIII, ch. VII, art. 226, para. 8 (Braz.).
Luiza Nagib Eluf, A New Approach to Law Enforcement: The Special Women's Police Stations in Brazil, in FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S STRATEGIFS FROM AROUND THE WORLD
199, 204-05 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992).
46
Id. at 205-08.
47
Id. at 205.
48
The institution of women's police stations may be a way of making the criminal
justice system more accessible to some women and seems an advisable policy decision.
Similar proposals have been made for the Navajo Nation. See, e.g.,James W. Zion & Elsie B.
Zion, Hozho' Sokee'--Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence UnderNavajo Common Law, 25 Aiuz.
ST. L.J. 407, 425-26 (1993) (arguing that to address domestic violence, Navajos should
identify and rethink their traditional values and develop responses accordingly). Zion and
Zion suggest, for example, relying on clan relatives' homes as "natural" safe-houses for
battered women and recommend using family members as probation officers. A program
in Wisconsin using lay advocates who assist in petitioning the court for protection, accompany victims to court, and attend divorce hearings with battered women, is another innovation. See Trubek, supra note 14, at 1125.
49
Memo from Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project ("HAIP") (Jan. 18, 1995) (on file
with the Cornell Law Review).
CONSTITUicAo FEDERAL
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women. 50 Special efforts to reach native Maori women and children
make this program a useful model for replication in working to address domestic violence in cross-cultural contexts.
The comprehensive program in Duluth, Minnesota, uses a combined criminal and therapeutic model and operates in three stages:
police are instructed to arrest batterers rather than tell them to "take
a walk and cool off'; representatives from battered women's shelters
and batterers' treatment programs are dispatched to talk with the parties immediately after the arrest; and batterers are often ordered by
courts to undergo treatment as an alternative to serving time in
prison.5 ' Researchers evaluating Duluth's program found that since
its introduction in 1981, conviction rates in domestic assault cases
have significantly increased, the number of women filing for protection orders has tripled, and the number of batterers brought back
into court for failure to comply with civil or criminal court orders has
52
risen tenfold.
Taking all the evidence together, it appears that harsher or even
more comprehensive criminal-oriented policies are not the panacea
feminists hoped they would be. Sweden, as mentioned previously,
made wife beating a public offense in 1982, but in 1989 only thirty-one
percent of the women in a study conducted at shelters wanted their
batterers arrested.53 In England, too, "[t] he criminal law is punitive,
rather than rehabilitative. It looks to past conduct and is rarely concerned with future behavior."54 If recent homicide statistics are an
indication of whether or not prevalent or innovative approaches to
domestic violence are working, it appears that current interventions
serve to protect men against violence at the hands of women, but do
not effectively protect battered women against the violence of men.
That is, while the number of women who have killed their male partners has declined, men are killing their female partners at the same
rate as before. 55
50
51
52

Id.
Randall, supra note 28, at 1180, 1183.
Id. at 1180.

Elman & Edwards, supra note 9, at 415.
54 Jane Connors, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Background
Paper on Violence Against Women 79 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
55 See Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploringthe Effect of Resource Availability and
the Likelihood of Female-PerpetratedHomicides, 23 LAW & Soc'Y Ray. 75, 91 (1989) (comparing
homicides in 1980-84 with those in 1967-79). That any battered woman is still driven to kill
her batterer, however, raises questions regarding the efficacy of current interventions allegedly designed to protect her from violence. See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, WOMEN AT
53

RIsK: DOMEsrTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN's HEALTH 130-131 (1996) for a brief explanation of

victim precipitated homicide.

1238

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1225

Aspects of the Hawaii Unified Court, the Dade County Domestic
Violence Court, and the Winnipeg Family Violence Court do provide
promise for re-thinking domestic violence policy which has heretofore
focused exclusively on traditional criminal interventions. More specifically, these courts have the potential to reduce the stigma faced by
battered women who choose to stay in their relationships, in that
these courts provide not only criminal but civil and other, including
therapeutic, remedies for addressing intimate abuse. In addition, programs like the women's police stations in Sao Paulo and the multiagency efforts in Duluth, Minnesota, and Hamilton, New Zealand
have all proven useful for helping women to better cope with the violence in their lives. And yet, research reveals that a comprehensive
response to domestic violence, one that combines criminal legal strategies with more affective or empowerment oriented interventions,
could go significantly further to reduce the occurrence of woman
abuse. 56 Before proceeding to the theoretical and practical underpinnings of this new system, I will first explore how current and innovative interactive frameworks have come to influence domestic violence
practice.
C.

Current and Innovative Interactive Frameworks for Working
with Battered Women in Domestic Violence Practice

A recent survey of shelter counselors reveals that those who believed that male abusers were 100% responsible for the violence between intimates advocated that a battered woman who decided to
remain married should be encouraged to change her decision and
leave her abusive partner;5 7 these self-identified feminist advocates believed that because a batterer is incapable of breaking the cycle of
battering, the survivor's only hope of safety was to leave. 58 In sharp
contrast, another study, which interviewed battered women on the status, over time, of their abusive relationships, revealed that theories of
learned helplessness which characterize the survivor as undecided,
56

See Larry L. Tifft, BATTERING OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AND THE

CASE FOR PREVENTION 133-35 (1993); see also David A. Ford & MaryJean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE
ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION, supra note 25, at 127. Ford and Regoli essentially argue that one of the most effective means of preventing future violence in an intimate relationship is to allow the battered woman to make choices in the prosecution
process (i.e., whether to drop charges). Id. at 159-60; see also Littleton, supranote 5, passim
(providing an interesting explication of the role of empowerment in mandatory prosecution policies).
57 A. Jay McKeel & MichaelJ. Sporakowski, How Shelter Counselors' Views About Responsibility for Wife Abuse Relate to Sertices They Provide to Battered Women, 8J. FAM. VIOLENCE 101,

107 (1993).
58 Id.; Crenshaw, supranote 19, at 1262-65 (describing shelter counselors in particular, and the battered women's movement in general, as rigid and inflexible, particularly in
their approach to women of color).
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weak, confused, and defenseless are inaccurate. 5 9 This study suggests
that the majority of battered women do indeed take actions to end the
violence in their lives and that helping professionals "need not be
frustrated if it does not happen instantaneously." 60 These researchers
observe: "In spite of serious physical and emotional problems resulting from abuse and the grief of a' significant relationship in serious
jeopardy, most women are able to either leave the abuser or find ways
to make the current relationship nonviolent."6 1
In legal discourse, Christine Littleton recently challenged advocates to reject prevailing views of battered women as helpless, and instead suggested that we construct a new feminist interpretation of a
survivor's experience by "believing women's own accounts, rather
than by asking them to fit into pre-existing legal categories. ' 62 Viewing battered women as the powerful survivors they are, Littleton suggests that the legal system be reformed to take account of the
contradictory feelings inherent in battering: battered women's emotional connection with and attachment to their abusive partners
should be respected in legal doctrine and practice when designing
interventions which protect them from the dangers posed by
65
battering.
Given the reality that so few battered women seek assistance, and
that those who do may be easily deterred from using those strategies
again should they fail, 64 it seems critical that when and if battered
women do seek assistance, legal practitioners, shelter counselors, and
social workers be prepared for the conflicting emotional contingencies they are likely to encounter. What do law professors and practitioners currently advocate in the way of domestic violence theory and
practice? In this section I draw on the work ofJoan Meier, Ann Shalleck, Peter Margulies, and Susan Bryant and Maria Arias to explore
and critique how the interactional structure of domestic violence
practice has been conceptualized thus far.
59

Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Relationship Status of Battered Women Over Time, 9 J. FAm.

VIOLENCE 99 (1994).
60 Id. at 110.
61 Id. at 109-10.
62 Littleton, supranote 5, at 267. I have made a similar argument in Empowering Battered Women Transnationally: The Casefor Postmodem Interventions, supranote 15. Schneider,
supra note 4, at 54849, makes a similar argument suggesting that none of the images of
battered women as victims or provocateurs are accurate depictions of women who are involved with abusive men. Moreover, such images ignore the reality that intimate abuse is a
form of oppression.
63 Littieton, supra note 5, at 269-72.

64 See, e.g., Cynthia G. Bowman, The ArrestExperiments: A Feminist Critique,83J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992) (arguing that battered women may be deterred from making reports if their interaction with the system was unsuccessful).
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Ann Shalleck in Clinical Contexts: Theoy and Practice in Law and
Supervision6 5 describes supervising students in a domestic violence case
that arose in the course of a law school clinic. 66 While much of the
focus of her article is on the challenges posed by clinical supervision,
it nevertheless provides insight into how one law school (American
University), and possibly others, 67 supervise law students who provide
services to battered women.
I have to admit that Shalleck's account of her students' representation of their client, Jessica Green, made me shudder. 6s The students
were, in some instances, wholly unprepared to represent a battered
woman. For example, they were legally and emotionally ill-equipped
to deal with the restraining order hearing they attended on Mrs.
Green's behalf.69 They seemed taken aback by the extent of the
judge's wrath and his impatience, which to an experienced lawyer representing battered women would not be at all surprising. 70 I too have
both law and social work students working with battered women and,

65

Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practicein Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U.

REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109

(1994).

Although it is not absolutely clear whether this case was a case Professor Shalleck
actually supervised, one can surmise that it is because Shalleck wrote that the article drew
upon "the traditions of, and [her] own experiences within, the clinical community in order
66

to describe one vision of clinical supervision." Id. at 111.
67
1d. at 109, 111-12. The author acknowledges the numerous people who conspired
on her project and conferences she attended from which she drew her conclusions.
68
In part, the description Shalleck provides inspired me to write this Article. Shalleck describes how the students make numerous errors in representing Ms. Green in court,
errors which might have been remedied by a more experienced lawyer, given the nature of
the judge hearing the proceeding. Should not a battered woman, though, whose very life
may depend on her lawyer's persuasiveness, skill, and understanding of institutional practices be represented by no one less than the best? Cunningham's article A Tale of Two
Clients: Thinking About Law as Language 87 MICH. L. REv. 2459 (1989), raises a similar
problem. Cunningham's case which he calls "the Silenced Lawyer," involves a federal prisoner and his student representatives. Id. at 2465-69. In that case, the client "fires" the
students on the grounds that they failed to heed his claim that his case was a broad constitutional challenge to the validity of the entire prison system-not the narrow due process
notice claim they had constructed. Id. at 2466-68. The worry is that the dissatisfied battered woman, unlike the federal prisoner, is unlikely to express her dissatisfaction with the
representation she is receiving, given the already overwhelming circumstance in which she
is ensnared. Indeed, the articles of Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women's Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Viion of
Lawyering that Empowers Clientsand Community, 42 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 21920 (1992) and Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground:IntegratingPsychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic rwlence in Theory and Practice, 21 HoFsrRA L. REv. 1295, 1343-47
(1993), document the passivity battered women express when they decide not to follow
students' advice and do not take legal action: they either do not call or do not show up.
69
See Shalleck, supra note 65, at 123-36.
70
It is interesting to note that the student's ignorance during the court proceeding
appeared to help them "get away with" lapses and pauses for which more experienced
attorneys would have been admonished. Id.
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in some instances, representing them. 71 For this reason, Shalleck's
retrospective account of the mistakes students made and the process
of learning and doing lead me to reflect on who should be allowed to
work with battered women, and with what training.
Shalleck's clinic seemed to provide little in the way of specialized
training for students working with battered women. Although it appears from her account that the clinic amply provided legal training,
it provided little or no information on the unique situation of battered women or the diversity of their reactions to violence. 72 Given
this limited training, it is not surprising that Shalleck's students
seemed overly focused on legal remedies, 73 rather than on developing
a relationship with their client, which would provide the seeds for discussing what legal or non-legal recourse she might need.
My informal study of survivors, which involves supervision of students who assist battered women in obtaining legal remedies such as
restraining orders through a Restraining Order Clinic and my ten
years experience representing Social Security disability claimants who
often had abuse histories, reveals that most battered women do not
know what legal relief they desire, nor do they understand their
"legal" or "non-legal" options. Indeed, Shalleck's clinic students were
so overly focused on proffering legal remedies, they never contemplated how Jessica Green felt when confronted with a judge who was
unsympathetic both to her need for support and her need to remain
housed with her children in the family residence. 74 Nowhere in Shalleck's article does she describe how the student representatives explored with Mrs. Green the abuse she had endured at the hands of
this judge, a man who minimized and marginalized the violence her
husband had inflicted. 75 Instead, the clinical supervision focused only
on how to get the legal relief Mrs. Green had originally sought, and
on how to help the students recover from their courtroom traumathe loss they felt when the judge denied their request for Mrs. Green's
support.76
A related problem, and one which should be avoided in other
clinics doing domestic violence work, occurred when the students in
Shalleck's clinic were not given a prior supervisory meeting before in71
I teach a Social Advocacy course in domestic violence which is offered to both Law
and Social Work students. Students assist clients in getting restraining orders at a Restraining Order Clinic in Santa Monica, California. Several of us at UCLA Law School are
also in the process of developing a domestic violence clinic, which will include my course
and the legal and clinical tenets I espouse.
72
See Shalleck, supra note 65, at 113-36.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 126-36.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 113-36.
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terviewing their client.7 7 Having asked countless law students, recent

graduates, 78 and law professors about their views on domestic violence, particularly on such questions as "How many believe a battered
woman should leave her abuser?" and "How many believe a battered
woman is wrong if she stays in an abusive relationship?", it is abundantly clear that students, lawyers, and law teachers all come to this
work with far too many unfounded and uninformed assumptionsabout victims (such as believing the victim is "wrong" if she stays),
perpetrators, and the violence in their own lives-to be able to interview battered women without extensive classroom and individual
training sessions. In many cases victims have no idea whether it is
legal action they want to take. Many of those who arrive at clinics or
seek legal assistance through legal services offices are 'making preliminary inquiries to determine if it is "a safe place" to talk.7 9 In this re-

gard, these initial interactions may very well be the one and only
chance the advocate has to entice a battered woman to seek any kind
of help, even if that help comes in the form of dialogue.
Joan Meier overcomes the limitations of Shalleck's clinical attitude, and our collective naivete on the complexities of domestic violence, by using a team teaching approach to supervising students in
domestic violence cases. 80 Meier, a law teacher, works with a psychologist to train students on psychological counseling techniques to be
used in client interviews. These techniques help students to dig beneath the surface of the battered woman's narrative, to understand
the subtext, and to decode the emotional and cultural micro and
meta messages. The students then use what they decipher to propose
alternative strategies with which the battered woman might be comfortable. Meier, enthusiastic about the team teaching approach, specifically describes the need for such an approach to enable students to
respond more appropriately to clients, and to aid, for example, in
overcoming student's dialogic paralysis in cases where the horrors of
one woman's story would render the psychologically untrained student speechless. 8 '
In my view, Meier's enthusiasm for a dual legal/psychological approach is tempered by her limited view of the lawyer's institutional
Id. at 113, 137.
I have presented these questions to numerous students in both social work and law
classes at UCLA and at Cardozo Law School classes. In addition, I have had extensive
discussions with groups of graduates from Harvard Law School, Boalt Hall School of Law,
Harvard School of Public Health, and law and social work professors in a training course
on domestic violence and child abuse.
79 I have found this to be the case based on my experience supervising students working with battered women and representing battered women on Social Security disability
claims myself.
80 See Meier, supra note 68, at 1322-66.
81
Id. at 1337.
77
78
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capacity. She specifically argues that "law students need a meaningful
conception of the lawyer's role in order to productively incorporate
the insights of psychology into that role. ' 82 And she assumes "[a] t
root, the lawyer's role is to act as an advocate for the client vis a vis
other people and institutions in the world." 83 In sharp contrast, Meier
argues, "[t] he therapist's role is characterized primarily by his or her
limitation to private, confidential communication only with the patient, as a supportive listener in an isolated one-on-one interaction,
without communication or advocacy in the larger world on the patient's behalf."8 4 The lawyer, Meier concludes, cannot be both.8 5 I
disagree. I am arguing that advocates for battered women have a responsibility to draw from psychoanalytic theory and practice to relate
to clients affectively, and to create interactional structures which dismantle patriarchical forms of dialogue that the traditional and even
progressive lawyer-client relationship has habitually mirrored.
Peter Margulies diverges from Meier's more limited conception
of the lawyer-client relationship by proposing a domestic violence
practice which recognizes a contextual approach.8 6 The core elements of his "affective" model of the lawyer-client relationship in domestic violence cases are access, connection, and voice. 8 7 He is
particularly concerned that these practices be adopted in legal services programs and that domestic violence becomes integral to the poverty law tradition. To ensure battered women have access to legal
clinics, Margulies recommends that survivors be given different income and asset standards from other clients. He argues that they
should be represented if they have either income or assets no greater
than twice the poverty level.8 8 He also encourages advocates for battered women's causes to join the boards of legal services programs,
and to lobby government and foundation funders to ensure that adequate allocations are made for representing battered women.8 9 In addition, he recommends that legal services offices develop branch
offices at sites where battered women are likely to present
themselves. 90
Connection, in contrast to access, involves concepts such as "mutuality," "care," and "empathy" 91 between the lawyer and client, mak82
83
84

Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361.
Id.

85

86

Id. at 1359-66.
Margulies, supranote 12, at 1092-1103.

87

Id.

Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1093-94.
90
Id. at 1094.
91 Empathy has been a topic of much concern to the progressive lawyering community, generating debate on its merit in practice. Few, if any, legal academics believe in it
88

89
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ing the lawyer's work more rewarding and making the client feel more
willing to offer information helpful to her case. 9 2 According to Margulies connection also means crossing professional boundaries, such
as transporting clients as social workers do, or taking clients through
emotional crises in a manner expected of a therapist. 93
Third, and finally, Margulies argues for a space for client voice,
'94
which translates into ideas such as "solidarity" and "participation.
This commitment to voice requires lawyers to help clear the way for
the possibility of consciousness raising, especially among poor women,
or women of color, who are battered and who may need similarly situated women to help them make important decisions regarding the
violence in their lives. 95 Margulies recommends pursuing this consciousness raising through peer support groups and through one's
connection with an affectively oriented lawyer.9 6 Voice for Margulies
also places a responsibility on lawyers to provide clients with enough
information about their legal options so that their participation in
97
legal and nonlegal decisionmaking is meaningful.
However progressive Margulies seems to be in conceptualizing a
broader emotional role for lawyers in domestic violence, he nevertheless stops short of encouraging battered women's advocates, that is,
law students or lawyers, from reflecting more personally on how they
themselves have experienced the violence they will witness in their
clients' lives and how those experiences affect the connection between affectivity and countertransference. 98 In this regard, Margulies
unconditionally. Those that tend to be more receptive include: LOPEZ, supra note 14, at
101-02; Lucie E. White, Seeking "... The Faces of Oth
s... " A Response to ProfessorsSarat,
Felstiner,and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1499 (1992). Those who find it a useless or even
harmful practice include: Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can FreeExpression Remedy Systemic Social Ills , 77 CORNELL L. Rlv. 1258
(1992); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
92 Margulies, supra note 12, at 1094.
93 Id. at 1094-95.
94 Id. at 1098.
95 Id. 1099-1100.
96

Id.

97

Id. at 1100.
Countertransference, of Freudian origin, is well-recognized in contemporary psychoanalytic theory and practice, and refers to an awareness that "'[y] ou can exert no influence if you are not susceptible to influence .... The patient influences [the analyst]
unconsciously ....
One of the best-known symptoms of this kind is the countertransference evoked by the transference.'" ANDREW SAMUELS, THE PLURAL PSYCHE: PERSONALITY,
MORALITY AND THE FATHER 147 (1989) (quoting CARL G. JUNG, THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHO98

THERAPY: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSFERENCE AND OTHER SUBJECTS

para. 163

(Herbert Read et al. eds. & R.F.C. Hull trans., 2d ed. 1966)).
Carl Jung describes the process more elaborately as follows:
Between doctor and patient, therefore, there are imponderable factors
which bring about a mutual transformation. In the process, the stronger
and more stable personality will decide the final issue. I have seen many
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seeks results without process, effects without means. He does not call
for a radical restructuring of the interactive framework of the advocate-survivor relationship, which would reflect a balancing of power, a
relinquishing of the "I know more" structure which characterizes even
the most progressive attorney-client relationships. 9 9

cases where the patient assimilated the doctor in defiance of all theory and
of the latter's professional intentions-generally, though not always, to the
disadvantage of the doctor.
The stage of transformation is grounded on these facts, but it took
more than twenty-five years of wide practical experience for them to be
clearly recognized. Freud himself has admitted their importance and has
therefore seconded my demand for the analysis of the analyst.
What does this demand mean? Nothing less than that the doctor is as
much "in the analysis" as the patient. He is equally a part of the psychic
process of treatment and therefore equally exposed to the transforming
influences. Indeed, to the extent that the doctor shows himself impervious
to this influence, he forfeits influence over the patient; and if he is influenced only unconsciously, there is a gap in his field of consciousness which
makes it impossible for him to see the patient in true perspective. In either
case the result of the treatment is compromised.
The doctor is therefore faced with the same task which he wants his
patient to face-that is, he must become socially adapted or, in the reverse
case, appropriately non-adapted. This therapeutic demand can of course
be clothed in a thousand different formulae, according to the doctor's beliefs. One doctor believes in overcoming infantilism-therefore he must
first overcome his own infantilism. Another believes in abreacting all affects-therefore he must first abreact all his own affects. A third believes in
complete consciousness-therefore he must first reach consciousness of
himself. The doctor must consistently strive to meet his own therapeutic
demand if he wishes to ensure the right sort of influence over his patients.
All these guiding principles of therapy make so many ethical demands,
which can be summed up in the single truth: be the man through whom
you wish to influence others. Mere talk has always been counted hollow,
and there is no trick, however artful, by which this simple truth can be
evaded in the long run. The fact of being convinced and not the thing we
are convinced of-that is what has always, and at all times, worked.
Thus the fourth stage of analytical psychology requires the counterapplication to the doctor himself of whatever system is believed in-and
moreover with the same relentlessness, consistency, and perseverance with
which the doctor applies it to the patient.
CARL G.JUNG, THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSFERENCE AND OTHER SUBJEGTs paras. 164-167 (Herbert Read et al. eds. & R.F.C. Hull trans.,

2d. ed. 1966).
99 Margulies comes closest to recognizing a shared history between lawyer and client
in PoliticalLau9,ering; One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate and Other Dichotomies of Poverty Law, 3 U.
MICH. J. GENDER & L 1996 (manuscript at 13-24, on file with the author). However, I
believe he still falls short of recognizing the need for reflection on personal experience as
a means of transgressing emotional boundaries, a process beneficial to both lawyer and
client. That lawyers should, in appropriate circumstances, actually disclose their history of
abuse to the clients and reveal their potential enmeshment in the clients' care, and that
together they emerge with the clients' truth, goes beyond Margulies' proposal of "getting
personal" in that, what I suggest is that the lawyers themselves, not only the clients, "get
personal."
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Susan Bryant and Maria Arias describe starting a Battered Women's Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School, 10 0 a public interest institution uniquely committed to producing public interest attorneys.
Three themes form the cornerstone of the relationship between the
law student and the battered woman that Bryant and Arias aim to
achieve: close attention to the diversity of client groups, the importance of practicing to "empower" battered women, and "the value of
education, as well as advocacy, in the lawyer's role."'' 1 The first
theme forces students to recognize the race, class, and cultural diversity of any given client and to understand how that diversity influences
both the client herself and the advisability of more systemic solutions. 102 Whether the client has financial resources, for instance,
must be considered when contemplating the client's options and decisions. Whether the client has a supportive family will also influence
what action a battered woman should take. And recognizing diversity
enables students to ask African-American clients, for example, how
popular images of African-American men as violent hinder their institutional or formal options.
The second theme focuses the advocate's attention on what the
battered woman wants from the lawyer or the legal system. 103 To empower clients, according to Bryant and Arias, is to allow them to make
their own decisions, to take whatever action they feel comfortable taking. The idea is to develop "a vision of the lawyer as a problem-solver
10 4
who works with people rather than makes choices for people."'
Finally, Bryant and Arias emphasize the need to ensure that students understand that serving battered women extends well beyond
litigation and demands their simultaneous involvement in nonlitigation strategies. 10 5 Legislative advocacy and other group-oriented work
is their recommended focus. 1 06 Although I find Bryant and Arias's

attention to diversity and empowerment a critical component of any
domestic violence practice, I believe it fails to go far enough. Using
their approach, lawyers and law students are relatively free to structure
their relationship with a battered woman without reflecting on how
their own experiences in violent relationships may influence the
choices they subtly encourage their clients to make.
Of all the advocates and academics writing on this topic, only
Joan Meier and Martha Mahoney are cognizant of the importance of a
self-reflective response when representing battered women. Drawing
100

Bryant & Arias, supra note 68.

101

Id. at 215.

102

Id.

103

104

Id. at 216.
Id.

105
106

Id.
Id.
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from psychoanalysis's concept of "countertransference,"' 0 7 Meier underscores the importance of recognizing how professionals' own personal histories may affect their response to their clients, and of
realizing the importance of encouraging advocates to understand "the
personal dimensions of their own responses to their client and those
of other players in the case."' 0 8 Unfortunately, as noted earlier,
Meier's conception of countertransference is as limited as her conception of the role of psychology in law.' 0 9 For Meier, countertransference was not a topic of general interest and application addressed in
class, but rather an issue law students grappled with in individual supervision." 0 Indeed, Meier does not encourage law students or lawyers in any categorical, or general, sense to use the usual methods of
peer support or professional supervision to cope with and understand
countertransference. Instead, she recommends a less proactive, selfreflective, personal, non-public approach."'
Martha Mahoney's work, however, encourages a different conception of self-reflection, one which is particularly useful in exploring the
emotional and cultural interpersonalities of domestic violence. Mahoney encourages practitioners to reflect on the legal images of battered
women and to tear away the "othering" assumptions which separate
advocates from clients, lawyers from survivors, and law students from
battered women." 2 In this regard, her work is specifically designed to
dispel myths that battered women are different from ourselves, that
they are dysfunctional, helpless, and dependent-images which prevent all women from identifying "ourselves and our experience as part
of a continuum of power and domination affecting most women's
lives."" 3 Mahoney argues persuasively that the work must center on
transforming
legal and social images of women [which] will in turn affect women's experience and understanding of our lives, allowing women
to recognize our experience as part of a larger system of subordina107
108

See supra note 98 (providing further explanation of this concept).
Meier, supranote 68, at 1349.

109 See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
110 Meier, supra note 68, at 1355. The reason countertransference is a cornerstone of
psychoanalytic practice, and should be to legal practice, particularly in domestic violence
cases, is that it affects everyone. The idea is that any interaction between client and lawyer,
lawyer and judge, and even friend and friend can evoke a personal memory or reaction,
which in turn colors, clouds, or infringes upon the story of the other.
I
Id. at 1354-56. This, in my view, only reinforces the status quo which represses
personal experience and feeling in legal discourse and interaction. I am suggesting that
we must free not only those willing to express their abuse histories, or those whose stories
reveal themselves, but also those who repress their memories. This can only be accomplished by recognizing the power and pervasiveness of countertransference in a systematic
and public way.
112

Mahoney, supra note 2, at 10-19.

"Is

Id. at 93.
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tion so that we can structure our understanding of our needs in
4
relation to those of other women facing oppression."
There is much to learn and to explore from the work of Professors Shalleck, Meier, Margulies, Arias, Bryant, and Mahoney. Access,
voice, connection, diversity, empowerment, and self-reflexivity are the
key underpinnings of an affective model for working with battered
women. In the next section, these themes form the basis of my exploration and critique of the dominant interpretive and interactive
framework of domestic violence. Also in that section, I explore how a
new, more dynamic juridical approach can emerge from this history
and experience.

III
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISCOURSE AND POLICY-. AN ARGUMENT
FOR RELATIONAL NOTIONS OF JUSTICE

In this part I will argue that criminal interventions-even the
most innovative ones-which potentially subject the batterer to incarceration are effectively unthinkable and, therefore, unusable for many
battered women. 1 5 This is especially true for the women who do not
perceive their experience as violent. 1 16 In fact, in being so remote
from such perceptions of their experience, laws that mandate subjecting women or abusers to the criminal process, especially as the only
remedy available, may well discourage women from coming to see the
7
violence in their lives as something they might eliminate or control."1
Correlatively, I will also explore in this section how these patriarchical
approaches have unwittingly forced battered women's advocates to
collude in disempowering survivors.
In arguing for more accessible interventions, I explore three specific issues that relate to the theoretical limitations, and hence limited
effect, of contemporary domestic violence practice. First, it is necessary to address the presuppositions that underlie contemporary legal
Id. at 94.
115 See Littleton, supra note 5, at 268 (proposing that due to "the lack of equal pay in
female jobs, the practical problems of finding alternative housing and the difficulty of
raising children alone," it is possible that "those women who stay in battering relationships
accurately perceive the risks of remaining, accurately perceive the risks of leaving, and
choose to stay either because the risks of leaving outweigh the risks of staying or because
they are trying to rescue something beyond themselves").
116 Mahoney, supra note 2, at 15-19.
117 Indeed, this is one of Cynthia Bowman's most important points: "After an automatic arrest, a battered woman may therefore be less likely to report subsequent abuse."
Bowman, supra note 64, at 204. See also Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable
114

Differences: Battered Women, Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WiFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION, supra note 25, at 96 (analyzing the tensions between the

culture of power and the contractions between the United States legal structure and women's needs).
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practices, even when those institutional methods are invoked by feminist lawyers. In its current form, recourse to the legal system is threatening to battered women because its conception of rights and
interventions is structured in such a way as to further isolate, individuate, and intimidate the survivor. Second, recourse to the legal system
has failed to take account of the ethnocentricity of the law's reaction
to intimate abuse. Law attempts to eradicate violence rather than understand it, and consequently fails to appreciate the complex cultural
relativity and emotional contingencies of everyday violence in relationships. Finally, I will suggest that only by understanding that domestic violence involves two subjectivities, that it exists in a mutual
"(space in between" the intimates, can we begin to comprehend the
postmodern diversity of responses necessary for, and appropriate to,
violent situations and the specific relationships in which they are
embedded.
A.

Recourse to the Legal System: (Mis)conceptions of the
Survivor's Rights and Remedies

In light of the statistical realities of women's reluctance to use the
legal system,"18 it is not surprising that political theorist and psychotherapist Jane Flax, in analyzing the theories of equality and difference in relation to justice, concludes that "[W] hile the necessity of the
feminist project of ending gender-based relations of domination remains, the appropriate means to do so seem ever more elusive and
uncertain."" 9 What is significant is that Flax argues that feminist
political theories of equality are embedded unwittingly in the language of abstract legal right and its objectifying practices. 12 0 Whether
claimed by feminists or by masculine rights bearers, the structure of
legal doctrine is such as inevitably to impose a distance between the
subject asserting rights and the state-organized system of implementing and protecting those rights. Feminist political theories of equality,
which rely upon the assertion of legally defined rights are, Flax suggests, inevitably "linked to a disembodied, abstract, impersonal rationality."' 2 ' The argument can be taken further. As Robert Cover and,
more recently, Martha Minow have argued, juridical rationality and,
specifically, the abstract and alienated quality of rights manifests itself
118 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
119 Jane Flax, Beyond Equality: Gender,Justice and Difference, in BEYOND EQUALrIY AND
DimRENCE 193, 195 (Gisela Bock & Susan James eds., 1992).
120 See id. at 198-95.
121
Id. at 196. Toni Massaro, to use another recent example, thus contends that law's
dependence on reason allows it to transcend personal interests and guarantees the legitimacy and, hence, universal applicability of its claims and procedures. See Massaro, supra
note 91 at 2100.
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in more than impersonality. 122 It manifests itself also in its own unwitting acts of violence: "[T] he relationship between legal interpretation
and the infliction of pain remains operative even in the most routine
of legal acts."'

23

This form of legal thought, I would suggest, replicates unconsciously the structure of violence that it is seeking to eradicate in intimate relationships. Not only does the state intervene as the
omnipotent savior and omniscient father, it does so without engaging
the battered woman as an equal partner and without relying on her
insight and experience to better understand exactly what legal measures should be taken to diminish the violence and when they should
be taken. 124 Assuming that violence in intimate relationships is inflicted when the male partner believes that he is stronger and smarter
than the female partner, and gender-empowered to do whatever,
whenever he wants, the structures of the relationships between the
state and the battered woman and the abusive partner and the survivor look frighteningly similar.125 The fact that both the batterer and
the state are incapable of relating to women in a more intimate or
particular way,' 26 that they are incapable of finding a "space in between," a third space co-created in a spirit of cooperation by both parties, reveals why criminalization remedies as they are currently
employed, even in their most innovative form, hopelessly replicate the
violence they seek to eradicate.
Although it is disappointing, it is not surprising given predictable
patterns of repetition, that domestic violence advocates, even those
previously battered who may be unwilling to admit that violence is in
different forms omnipresent in every relationship, 12 7 would unwittingly
adopt responses to violence such as mandatory criminalization that
mimic the patriarchy they seek so much to escape. To end violence as
122

See Martha Minow, Introduction:Robert Cover and Law, Judging and Toleznce, in N~ARRA210 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,

Th'E, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER

1992).
123 Robert M. Cover, Vio!nce and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986); see also Durston & Mills, supra note 14, at 121-23.
124 Here I am describing the situation where the state, or the prosecutor's office, proceeds regardless of the battered woman's iterated and reiterated desires-not the case of
the battered woman who wishes to proceed and does so as a full partner in the state's

action.
125 When I made this point in a recent editorial, the Los Angeles District Attorney's
office denied such a connection. See Linda G. Mills, Battered Women Need Better, L.A. TIMS,
Jan. 28, 1996, at M5; Gil Garcetti & Scott Gordon, D.A. on Domestic Volence Cases, L.A.

TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996, at B8.
126 By particularized justice, I refer to the idea that legal intervention can and should
be tailored to the subjects who invoke the law. This is a form of the particularity and
generality that Elizabeth Schneider describes in her article, supranote 4, passim but in its
most practical application.
127 For a thoughtful discussion of the "we" of violence, see SUSANNE KAPPELER, THE
WILL TO VIOLENCE: THE POLITICS OF PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR 20-23 (1995).
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we know it, the law must begin to model a more loving relationship
with women, one which respects their experience and insight and
draws on them to fashion interventions in their own lives. For it is
only through these new alternative ways of relating that battered women will realize, and actually experience, possibly for the first time,
non-abusive ways of relating. To empower the battered woman herself
to understand her tolerance for various forms of violence and to help
her to recognize these familiar interactive structures is the only way we
can begin, on a grand scale, to eradicate these repetitious and destruc28
tive patterns from women's lives.'
On a more abstract and systemic level, the difficulty lies in the
contradiction between a juridical process which is allegedly committed to responding feministically to domestic violence, and hence, individualistically to the demands of victims, and one that is pressured to
appear unbiased and impartial in its treatment of cases.' 29 The effects
of this contradiction, particularly on the battered women themselves,
are exacerbated by the additional burden on survivors bringing legal
actions-they become the political tool, a pawn if you will, for battered women's advocates who believe that each survivor's court victory
sends a loud and clear message to the patriarchal community that
abuse will not be tolerated.' 3 0 The result is that the individual narrative, the needs and the subjectivity of the survivor, the particular voice,
becomes lost in the universality and abstraction of the dominant legal
discourse and its habitually dichotomous actions that cannot, by their
very nature, take account of the particularity of any given woman's
3
experience.' '
I am arguing that the state and the criminal law cannot act as
everything to everyone. Given that so few women use the legal system,
and given that those who do may find it unresponsive to their individual needs, the law cannot be simultaneously personal and political,
128 To eliminate these patterns from women's lives is to take the first step towards
eliminating them from men's lives. Even social science reveals the link between empowering the battered woman and reducing future violence. See Ford & Regoli, supra note 56, at
159-60.

129 Never has this tension been more apparent than in the case of the Honorable
Cindy S. Lederman, the family court judge in Miami, Florida who started the dedicated
domestic violence court there. Once the dedicated court had been established, the public
defender's office in that district sued Judge Lederman, claiming that she was biased towards victims and against defendants. The Florida Supreme Court refused to hear the
case. A.G. v. Lederman, 643 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1994).
130 Ironically, these educational efforts have not been particularly effective in changing
attitudes. See Grasmick et al., supra note 28, at 323 (finding in their national study that
"[d]espite all the publicity concerning intimate violence during the past decade, respondents in 1992 experience no greater pain of shame or remorse for physically hurting someone on purpose than did respondents in 1982").
131 By this I refer to the judgments of courts, that is, when judges must decide who
does and does not get custody, who stays in the primary residence and who does not, etc.
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attentive and abstract, biased and unbiased. Indeed, when it tries to
do so, it inflicts its own violence. It imposes a monolithic criminal
solution upon a spectrum of attitudes and subjective perceptions of
survivors, and hence, inhibits the majority of battered women from
seeking assistance. Finally, being ill-equipped to address the complex
and sometimes conflicting needs of battered women, it fails to provide
132
opportunities to avert abuse.
In sum, I find that laws against domestic violence which disrupt
or destroy the battered woman's intimate life, without her input at
every stage in the institutional intervention, rob her of the opportunity to act on her own behalf. In this regard, the law is inappropriately preoccupied with eradicating violence, with a misguided agenda
that interprets every legal success or failure as a political victory or
setback. But violence is much more complex than an analysis of patri133
archy implies-both battering in gay relationships and elder abuse
prove that violence crosses gender boundaries and is much more dynamic than the dominant ideology of woman abuse implies.
Moreover, legal practices which seem preoccupied with "the
political" unwittingly inflict, albeit in state-legitimized form, a violence
that mimics the very patriarchy the battered woman may seek to escape. In this regard, exclusive or primary reliance on criminal or state
intervention to protect battered women may very well be
counterfeminist, or even counterpolitical, insofar as it disables the majority of these survivors from recognizing, confronting, and taking the
steps they themselves need to take in order to address the violence in
their lives and ultimately the violence in the lives of all women. This is
nowhere more manifest than in the law's failure to address the differing cultural contexts and languages of violence in domestic relations
described in more detail below.
B. Ethnocentricity of the Law's Reaction to Domestic Violence
White, western feminists who have dictated a unidimensional approach to domestic violence have often been criticized for making assumptions about women that do not hold universally, and in
particular, are not appropriate to women of color. 134 Cultural and
familial norms variously influence women to silently endure abusive
132 Although I do not believe that women cause the violence to which they are subjected, I do believe that they have some small degree of control over averting it. For example, battered women can avoid their abusers by going to a shelter or taking other
extraordinary measures to stay safe. I am not suggesting that these measures are in any way
foolproof or that the abuser is not fully responsible and accountable for his violent actions.
133
For a description of the similarities and differences in lesbian and elder abuse, see
Schneider, supra note 4, at 542-48.
134
See Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1242-43 ("Contemporary feminists and antiracist
discourses have failed to consider intersectional identities such as women of color.");
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relationships.' 3 5 Women living in cultures that value community over
individuality, for instance, as well as those that hold women fundamentally responsible for the preservation of community over individuality (which may be to say most of the world's cultures), face
enormous barriers when confronting domestic violence.
As Nilda Rimonte explains, a woman abused by her husband in
some Pacific-Asian cultures will "hesitate[ ] a very long time before
attempting to do anything about the violence at all." Rimonte continues, "[t] o some, her inaction (and silence) suggests collusion. In fact,
it is an indication of the desperation induced by the limited vocabulary of self-definition permitted by her culture, and the terrible price
she must pay to preserve her identity within her culture." 3 6 Indeed,
immigrant women from similar cultures may be doubly victimized.
Not only will cultural practices influence them to endure violence, but
legal constraints on their immigration status will prevent them from
37
reporting their batterer.
Kimberle Crenshaw' 3 8 conceptualizes the problem of AfricanAmerican domestic violence in a similar way. She observes that in the
African-American community, a Black woman who seeks criminal action against her violent partner may be perceived as a traitor, and that
it is impossible to deny that racism contributes to the cycle of vioMany feminist critics have written powerfully about the way in which the
notion of womanhood has been described as a single uniform experience,
and the way in which that has excluded a multiplicity of experiences based
on race, class, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and other dimensions....
It is crucial that our theoretical framework be expanded, and traps of essentialist thinking avoided, for in practice battered women are not all similarly
situated.
Schneider, supranote 4, at 531-32 (citations omitted). See generallyNilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: CulturalApproval of Irolence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and
the CulturalDefense, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1322 (1991) (arguing that intervention with a
domestic violence victim that provides a "message of choices and rights may not be appropriate for Pacific-Asians").
135 The social science-type literature on the multicultural complexities of addressing
domestic violence is extensive and thought-provoking. A sampling includes: Jacqueline R.
Agtuca, A COMMUNITY SECRET: FOR THE FILIPINA IN AN ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP (rev. ed.
1994); Paula Gunn Allen, Violence and the American Indian Woman, in THE SPEAKING PROFITS
US: VIOLENCE IN THE LVES OF WOMEN OF COLOR 5, 5-7 (Maryviolet C. Burns ed., 1986);

Evelyn C. White, Life is a Song Worth Singing: Ending Violence in the Black Family, in THE
SPEAKING PROFITS US: VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN OF COLOR 11, 12-13 (Maryviolet C.

Burns ed., 1986); Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Vwlence in theJewish
Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171 passim (1995); Deeana L. Jang, Caught in a Web:
Immigrant Women and Domestic rwlenc 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 397, 402 (1994); Mieko
Yoshihama, Violence Against Asian Pacific Women Perpetrated by Male Intimates (Aug.
16, 1994) (paper presented at the Symposium on Asian Pacific and Asian Pacific American
Women in Relationships, on file with author).
136 Rimonte, supra note 134, at 1319.
137 For the experiences of immigrant battered women in the legal system, see id. passim; Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1246-50; Margulies, supranote 12, at 1095-96.
138 See Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1256-57.
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lence.13 9 Beth Richie argues that popular images of Black men as violent dissuade African-American women from reporting their abusers
out of fear of contributing to racial stereotypes. 40 However, both
Crenshaw and Richie argue that racial allegiances and community influence often prevail over gender oppression. 14 1 Indeed Richie describes disclosure or reporting of domestic violence in the AfricanAmerican community as all too often interpreted as a form of
42
"treason."1
Institutional shortcomings in domestic violence systems are exacerbated when battered women of color contemplate seeking assistance. These women are doubly and triply marginalized and excluded
when cultural pressures equate help-seeking from mainstream institutions with racial treason. Making the situation worse is the reality that
many battered women and battered women of color reject legal intervention because it will effectively terminate their relationship with the
batterer-a man they may need culturally, emotionally, or financially.
Hence, the third conceptual problem with criminal intervention, described in more detail below, is that these strategies ignore the relational needs of battered women, and disregard the reality that
violence can only be eradicated when battered women themselves decide that they are prepared to understand how violence forms a part
of their lives.
C.

Domestic Violence Involves Two Subjectivities

To address the emotional and doctrinal complexities and demands of particularized justice, some feminist theorists have proposed
an agenda which adopts so-called relational notions ofjustice, that is,
systems which recognize social interaction and intimate relations as
their cornerstone. 143 Indeed, it is primarily through intimate others
that many women come to know themselves and learn to mediate the
emotional, cultural, and even financial features of their personal wellbeing.
As painful (and, perhaps, embarrassing) as it is for feminists to
acknowledge, women's comparative dependence on the intimate presence and active, involved expression of the other'4 suggests that emo139

140

Id.

Beth E. Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challengefor the Black Community, 16

SCHOLAR

BLACK

24, 24-25 (1985).

Crenshaw, supra note 19, at 1257; Richie, supra note 140, at 41.
Richie, supranote 140, at 41.
143 See Flax, supra note 119, at 197; Deborah L. Rhode, The Politics of Paradigms: Gender
Difference and Gender Disadvantage,in BEroNa EQuALIrY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 119, at
141
142

149, 156-58.
144 SeeJane Flax, ContemporaryAmerican Families:Decline or Transformation?, in FAMILIES,
POLMCS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21, 28-36 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983).
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tional and physical violence may not be altogether incompatible with
women's ways of knowing and patterns of relating. Without judging
how such patterns are formed and why they manifest in more extreme
forms in some intimacies than in others, it is apparent that the battered woman may be reluctant to sever completely her interactional
ties with her batterer. Nevertheless, when violence erupts and the batterer is removed from the intimate setting, the woman survivor is emotionally displaced and deprived of an important linkage to herself.
Jane Flax, drawing on D. W. Winnicott's theory of symbolization
and culture, 145 describes social interaction for women, the events
themselves and the experienced feelings, as a "transitional" space, a
world that "has its own processes, tasks and ways of making sense out
of experience."146 She continues:

[T] his space is transitional only in the sense that it bridges the gaps
between self and other and inner and outer reality. It is a permanent facet of our mental life; it is not part of a stage of development
that is necessarily incorporated into some subsequent or higher
state. It does, however, continually grow in complexity and
richness. 147
Along these same lines, law professor Peter Goodrich describes
interactional space between friends and lovers when illuminating how
12th-centuryjudgments in Courts of Love and contemporary feminist
thought converge to raise legal questions concerning what justice
should be accorded human relationships. 148 Goodrich argues that
casuistry and an explicit feminization of law demand that we delineate
regulae amoris, or publicly formulated rules that bring "ethics to love,
[and] justice to relationship."' 49
In reifying what Goodrich calls "the space in between" lovers, we
acknowledge the importance of contextualizing a woman's perspective, a process which may entail accounting for her attachment to the
relationship before we can begin to formulate intervention policies
which go beyond the unidimensional criminal approach and more appropriately address a woman's complex and specialized needs. Such
efforts may also involve devising paths to neutral and cooperative interactive spaces-and methods for travelling there-where together
the battered woman and the state, the survivor and her advocate, and
even the victim and her abuser, can find the shared ground needed to
imagine, and create, a world free of violence.
(1971).

145

See D.W. WINNicoTr,

146

Flax, supra note 119, at 204.

147

Id.
Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgments of

148

PLAYING AND REALITY

Love, 48 STAN. L. REv. 633, 667 (1996).
149

Id.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1256

D.

[Vol. 81:1225

Imagining New Interventions for Battered Women

In sum, a multi-faceted and multi-deliberative legal system which
responds to the survivor's need for flexibility is necessary to help her
work through her personal ways of knowing, being, and relating, and
to learn specifically to distinguish in her mind and soul between violence and healthy expressions of intimacy. In this vein, interventions
for battered women, both legal and otherwise, must take account of
the dynamic and contingent nature of violence as it manifests in the
space in between intimates. That the law is distant and itself violent,
abstract, and abusive, especially to women and particularly to women
of color, requires that we envision a more reflexive system, one which
requires judges to reflect on how they intentionally or unintentionally
inflict state-legitimized violence on marginalized groups, particularly
those groups bearing characteristics distinctly different fi-om their
own. 150 In addition, attorneys must be cognizant of these institutional
practices, and their implied complicity when participating in them. It
is clear, for example, that affective advocates should avoid the formal
legal system if the threat of state-legitimized violence seems
plausible. 15 1
Advocates too should focus their attention on how they hold
themselves, either personally or institutionally, above violence, contributing to erroneous assumptions that they can eradicate violence in
women's lives. Violence can only be eradicated when we make an effort to understand its undercurrents, uncover its unconscious, and undercut its underbelly in each of us. An important aspect of this
personal and collective psychoanalytic expression is to recognize that
feminism and the feminist juridical project must reject the rationalistic male models which preceded our institutional presence, and imagine systems that accept the complex and individualistic emotional and
cultural structure of women's lives.

150 For an account of the biases of Social Security Administrative LawJudges, and for a
sketch of a proposal to reform judicial practices to ensure more reflexivity in decisionmaking, see LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRAVELING BIAs IN JuDI IAL. DECi-

(forthcoming 1997); Linda G. Mills, A Calculus for Bias: How Malingering
Females and Dependent Housewives Farein the Social Security DisabilitySystem, 16 HARv. WOMEN'S
SION-MAKING

LJ. 211 (1993).
151
By way of example, there is one judge in Los Angeles County who often refuses to
grant restraining orders to women (based on the reports of students the author supervises
and on informal conversations with advocates working in the Los Angeles courts). Knowing that thisjudge may be unsympathetic, advocates may want to develop alternative methods for documenting domestic violence to ensure that the survivor is not further
traumatized by the court process. The Court Watch program in Los Angeles is one
method advocates should use to "monitor" the attitudes ofjudges to ensure that battered
women are not re-traumatized byjudges.
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IV
REFORMING DoMESTic VIOLENCE PRACTICE: TowARD AN AFFE TrVE
CLIENT DYNAMIC AND A COMPREHENSIVE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

To achieve the programmatic restructuring of legal interventions
described below, the interactive framework of domestic violence practice must be radically transformed. In this section I draw from the
best current practices used by advocates to relate to battered women,
described in Part II, and build upon my own experience of teaching
students and training practitioners in the techniques of affective lawyering. The lawyer, I will argue, as much as the social worker or doctor,
can only respond to their clients' needs if they understand and appreciate their clients affectively.
A.

Toward An Affective Client Dynamic

Domestic violence clinics in the United States (sometimes referred to elsewhere as restraining order clinics or Battered Women's
Rights Clinics), legal services centers, hospital emergency rooms, prosecutors' offices, and police stations worldwide have the potential to be
important institutional settings within which women who experience
violence can come to face the abuse in their lives. My work with these
agencies, together with the evidence I have mounted, overwhelmingly
affirms that rather than helping the majority of battered women to
address the violence in their lives, these institutions unwittingly force
a majority of survivors to suppress it. Front-line workers in these agencies must be trained to ensure that no battered woman feels
prejudged or forced underground because of her desire or unwillingness to pursue a given course of action. One way to reduce that likelihood is to ensure that advocates trained in basic postmodern clinical
techniques, or in affective lawyering methods, are available for survivors of domestic violence who are not or may not yet be ready or prepared to take legal or other formal action.
Affective clinical practices address the survivor in her own emotional space and respond to the specific relationship and subjectivities
within which she is to be found. Rather than adopting a normative
approach, such postmodern clinical interventions respect the survivor's relational structure and also provide the space, the time, and the
fluidity necessary for self-guided resolution. Such a system recognizes,
too, that true empowerment for the battered woman will be achieved
not through obedience to the expectations of legal or social work advocates, but rather through a system which acknowledges that she herself must reconsider and reevaluate the meaning of the violence in a
time frame and an environment that supports the fluctuating complexity of her particular circumstance. It would go a significant way
toward establishing a postmodern client dynamic-a dynamic that in-
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corporates multi-deliberative legal and social work systems in order to
recognize and respond to survivors' particular and evolving needs-if
law students and practitioners who work with battered women were
trained in three basic, interrelated clinical principles.
First, working on the principle that clinicians are ineffective when
unaware of their emotional experiences, it is the lawyer's responsibility to reflect on the violence, in all its various forms, that they have
experienced or tolerated in their own lives-both personally and professionally, both intimately and institutionally. To be truly effective, in
other words, practitioners must make an ongoing, concerted effort to
understand their own history and experience of violence in relationships before working with battered women. Only in this way do they
have a chance of leaving their own histories, prejudices, and presuppositions in relation to intimate violence, at the clinic door. This in
itself is no simple task; the potential of practitioners to internalize the
other two basic principles depends on their success with this first.
Second, domestic violence workers must treat their clients as they
themselves would want to be treated. Again, practitioners can accept
the survivor for who she is and where she is in her emotional development only if they recognize from their own personal experience the
multifaceted, insidious, paradoxical, complex, and confusing character of intimate violence.
Finally, and most importantly, front-line legal and social workers
must empower battered women to take the incremental steps they feel
they are prepared to take. To be effective, then, practitioners must
take the clinical journey with the client. They must venture with their
clients just far enough to encourage the client's safety and to help
them learn more about their conundrum. However, practitioners
must not venture so far as to alienate their clients from the professional resources available when and if they are ready to take the next
step. I address each of these issues more specifically below.
1. Reflect on the Violence in One's Own Life
"We can'tjudge a battered woman's decision to stay in an abusive
relationship until we explore the violence we deny or accept in our
own lives," I warned the law students in my advocacy class. "How
many people tolerate abuse from parents, lovers or friends?," I continued. A few raised their hands. "Consider the following possibilities:
Did your brother ever hit you? Did you hit him back? When was the
last time your mother, your father, your lover, humiliated you? Interrupted you? What did you do about it? When was the last time you
humiliated others dear to you? How did they respond?" Suggesting
to my students that we all tolerate and perhaps even inflict or at least
participate in intimate violence, I encouraged them to explore the
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abuse in their own lives before rendering judgment or offering advice
to the battered women they would counsel. In journals kept specifically for this purpose, almost all students who worked with "battered"
women realized that their own histories of violence were not entirely
unlike those of their clients. Moreover, given that similar or different
forms of violence had gone so completely unnoticed in their own
lives, the students had no legitimate grounds on which to judge their
15 2
clients for their decisions to leave or stay.
Several theorists and practitioners have argued that instead of
asking "Why doesn't she leave?," the appropriate question is "Why
does he batter?" 153 Of course, the problem is that it is nearly impossible to train people out of the question "Why doesn't she leave?" when
so many of us are so busy denying or ignoring the violence in our own
lives, hence seeing the battered woman's conundrum as more obvious
than it is in actuality. I suggest that the means for transgressing the
"Why doesn't she leave" question and getting to the "Why does he
batter?" question is to explore (in therapeutic settings, including individual treatment and group support, and in case supervision at clinic
law schools both in and out of the classroom) the ways in which we
ourselves (particularly those of us who feel among the so-called nonabused) tolerate violence in our own lives. My students who did this
work found that representing battered women is as much about helping clients take incremental steps toward self-discovery and insight, as
it is about taking concrete steps toward eliminating violence from
their own lives. To do so, we all concluded, is to undertake a radical
program of long-lasting change which is achievable only through personal decisionmaking arrived at through a means and in a time frame
with which we as individuals and as members of our particular cultures and communities are comfortable.
2.

Accept the Battered Woman as She Is

Once practitioners begin self-discovery, and recognize and start
to grapple with the violence they tolerate, they are prepared, regardless of their professional training, to work with a battered woman, a
woman who is probably no less equipped than the practitioner to address the violence in her own life-just less confident and in more
danger. Toward this end, the practitioner must be painstakingly sensitive to achieving a most delicate balance. On the one hand, the bat152 See Meier, supranote 68, at 1349-50 (discussing countertransference and domestic
violence practice).
153 By way of example, see id. at 1317-20; Mahoney, supra note 2, at 5-7; Littleton, supra
note 5, at 268-70; Schneider, supra note 4, at 557-59, all of whom argue that the ease with

which people observe, judge, and distinguish themselves from the projected image of bat-

tered women is ludicrous. In Schneider's words, "[r]equiring a battered woman to leave is
a projection of a higher standard of conduct." Id. at 559.
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tered woman seeks the practitioner's insight, guidance, and expertise.
On the other hand, the exigency of the battered woman's situation
can only contribute to her overriding fear that the system will judge
whatever action (or inaction) she has taken to date and diminish the
little power she may have to act in the future. 15 4 If she feels
prejudged, implicitly or explicitly forced to act, or pressured to take
steps she is not prepared to take, then she may become alienated from
the worker and reject whatever help is offered (or pretend to accept it
but later fail to follow through on appointments, etc.). This aspect of
"meeting" the client is in some respects the most important, because it
involves drawing the client in and sustaining her involvement long
enough for her to identify with a vision of a better, freer life for herself and to develop a plan for achieving it which keeps her safe in the
meantime. To lose her to prejudgment may not only further increase
the woman's probably already well-developed sense of hopelessness
and despair, but it could have life-threatening consequences as
well.' 55
3.

Baby Steps Only

Gently, ever so gently, the task of the practitioner advocate is to
offer enough information, enough insight, and enough options to
empower the client to think, to imagine, and, possibly, to act. The
practitioner should hope for everything but expect nothing and then
be thrilled if, and when, in the gentle (i.e., nonjudgmental, interactional) space, the battered woman decides to act. Recognition that
movement comes incrementally, that denial is fierce, and that immediate action is rare, are the only assumptions that practitioners should
make. Most importantly, the practitioner should realize that the point
is not to eradicate violence as we know it by ending their relationship
now, but rather to enable a battered woman to come to realize that it
is she alone who can understand the violence in her life and how she
wants to respond to it.156

154

For a sensitive interpretation of these issues, see Margulies, supra note 12, at 1097.

See Meier, supranote 68, at 1343-47 for a related discussion describing the client
who wants affirmation of her decision to leave by the attorney representing her. See aLso
Margulies, supra note 99, at 1078-84 (describing the importance of expressions of worry
and affirmation).
156 I realize this is a controversial point. Advocates of a law and order approach argue
that it is the state's responsibility to keep society civil and non-violent. The studies described in detail herein, however, especially the arrest studies, do not reveal that state intervention necessarily prevents future violence. Indeed, as I have argued, it may not only in
some cases exacerbate it, but in others, send victims further underground.
155
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A Comprehensive Institutional Approach

Armed with this clinical approach that recognizes the crucial factor that women's relationships may be important to them for cultural,
emotional, social, or even political reasons, even when they involve
violence, and that battered women may find criminal interventions
disempowering and unapproachable, legal and related systems must
be reformed to welcome all battered women needing services irrespective of the nature or status of their relationships. Toward this
end, existing criminal systems should be enhanced to ensure that the
medical, legal, and social work personnel most likely to encounter survivors are trained in affective clinical techniques and are prepared to
address and to understand the shifting uncertainty of a survivor's experience as she grapples with a multitude of conflicting loyalties. A
reflexive legal/social work-oriented system that is designed to reach
battered women whose relational and associated financial, emotional,
or cultural needs are currently unmet, should be implemented by all
existing programs serving battered women, including but not limited
to hospital emergency rooms, police programs, prosecutors' and legal
services offices, hotlines, shelters, and restraining order clinics.
Under such a system, women would be invited to file domestic
violence complaints in informal but confidential and private settings,
such as hospital emergency rooms staffed with social workers, womenrun police stations, legal services offices, or telephone hotlines. These
reports could be stored as documentation for verification of future
incidents. For women who desire them, restraining orders and other
legal remedies would also be available at these same locations. Other
safety measures, including shelter stays for either the victim or perpetrator, house surveillance, and monitoring devices would be available
on request through these front-line service centers. Criminal or civil
actions would be available but pursued only when and if the client is
ready to file and physically and emotionally prepared to proceed. 15 7
But, again, legal alternatives are not sufficient means to help most
battered women see beyond the violence that defines for her an unhappy and unhealthy life. Front-line workers at each service center
should be equipped to educate battered women on the financial resources available to them through welfare, credit (on her or her husband's or partner's accounts), medical and housing benefits, child
care allocations, and alimony. They should also be aware of employment opportunities and resources. When women worldwide are not
provided with concrete tools to modify their social or economic cir157

In previous work, I recommended that the United States develop a commission

system to handle incidents of intimate abuse-a special judicial body that would be prepared to investigate and remedy instances of abuse, based on the survivor's needs and
desires. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 15, at 266.
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cumstances, the likelihood of the recurrence of maltreatment
1 58
increases.,
This comprehensive institutional approach would advance domestic violence policy not only because it would offer alternatives to
criminal intervention but also because it would empower the battered
woman to design the course of action she feels would eradicate violence from her life. This model provides a flexible remedy menu
(emotional, practical, financial, or legal support) in existing battered
women's programs and a time line that respects the uncertainty generated by conflicting loyalties. Such choice and the opportunity for
her to control her future may be just what the battered woman needs
in order finally to face, incrementally and at her own pace, what she
may have otherwise tolerated for fear of the essentialist legal system,
and its blunt criminal instruments, and her history of violence.
CONCLUSION

The problem with current strategies, I am arguing, is that we have
neglected the importance of the survivor's relationship to the violence
she tolerates. Such an approach ignores the significance, theoretically
and practically speaking, of treating a woman in the fluid context of
her relationships and of recognizing that her uncertainty, and emotional and cultural loyalties, demand a safe and non-judgmental space
in which to explore her issues. By taking the lead to incorporate civil,
criminal, and administrative legal interventions with postmodern
clinical practices that provide an openness to options and embody an
ethos for empowerment through self-paced, and self-initiated change,
domestic violence advocates can reinvigorate domestic violence policies and programs with a value on the particularity of any given battered woman's experience that appears necessary to ensure her full
participation in the effort to understand and address violence in her
life.
In sum, a new language for intimate abuse demands that we rethink two crucial points that have influenced the structure and form
of domestic violence theory and practice of the past two decades.
First, a rights based criminal response to domestic violence which disengages and alienates survivors through its unitary impersonality and
state-legitimized normative coercion, may intensify the very violence it
seeks to eradicate by repressing it. To understand violence, then, and
to circumscribe its effects, we need to devise systems and strategies
that provide the survivor the emotional space within which to understand her history and relationship to violence in order to act in her
158

See, e.g., Cristina Zurutuza, Domestic Violence: Strategies Used by the Latin AmericanWo-

men's Movement, in WOMEN WATCHED AND PUNISHED 59 (Latin American Committee fo/ the
Defense of Women's Rights ed., 1993).
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own best interest. Such measures entail an element of professional
self-criticism and client-self reflection, the postmodern conjunction of
what I have termed affective lawyering which enables client empowerment. A second, and related, point is that the survivor's subjective
experience of the violence, whether a tickle is a bruise, a glance is a
violation, or a stroke is a slap, is as relevant when designing or enforcing interventions as is the legal, normative, or culturally essentialist
definition of violence. Only if and when the survivor's subjectivity is
heard and unjudged, repeated and introjected, or most significantly,
melded into current approaches, will she begin to feel the liberty to
describe, in any real detail, the experience she seeks to unburden. To
think that current institutional philosophies unwittingly disregard and
hence exclude the very women these systems seek to embrace is the
tragedy, and irony, of the feminist policies employed and so effectively
implemented thus far.

